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The Compatibility Of Economic And
Environmental Objectives In
Governmental Decision Making
In the Environmental Quality Act of 1970 the California Legisla-
ture expresses the intent that environmental protection shall be the
guiding criterion in public decisions. This position has been criti-
cized by those who contend that economic impact should also be
given high priority. This comment analyzes the existing authority
for governmental entities to consider economic factors and pro-
poses that the economic evaluation of alternative land uses offers
the best framework within which to consider both economic and
environmental impact. The comment proceeds to analyze pro-
posed economic impact legislation and then suggests an alterna-
tive. It concludes that if carried out properly, economic analyses
and environmental analyses are complementary and not conflict-
ing.
In 1970 the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) was
enacted, requiring for the first time that environmental considerations
constitute a major factor in shaping the future economic growth of
this state.' Under CEQA public agencies must give high priority
to environmental factors when judging the merits of a proposed project.
Although it appeared that virtually everyone was in favor of environ-
mental reform, it soon became apparent that the scope of acceptable
environmental control would foster a storm of controversy. It is this
controversy which forms the substance of this comment.
The initial dispute, whether CEQA applied to private as well as pub-
lic projects, gave rise to Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors2
wherein the California Supreme Court settled the question in the af-
firmative. The decision was applied restrospectively,3 and the require-
ment of an environmental impact report (EIR) resulted in a virtual
construction standstill within some areas of the state,4 including those
1. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21000 et seq.
2. 8 Cal. 3d 1, as modified, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761
(1972).
3. Id. at 272, 502 P.2d at 1065, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
4. See generally, Hearings on the California Environmental Quality Act Before
the California Senate Local Government Committee, Oct. 25, 1972.
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private projects which had previously applied for and received the
necessary building permits. This particular problem was subsequently
remedied by the passage of Assembly Bill 889 by the California Legis-
lature. 5 This bill provided in part that the Friends of Mammoth
decision was to be applied prospectively. Thus those projects having
proper approval prior to the rendition of the decision were free of
the EIR requirement and could be continued. 6
A more persistent problem, and one with which Assembly Bill 889
made no attempt to deal, stems from the now famous footnote 8 of
the Friends of Mammoth decision. Echoing federal court interpreta-
tions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 7 CEQA's
parent act,8 the court stated that "if the adverse consequences to the
environment can be mitigated, or if feasible alternatives are available,
the proposed activity, such as issuance of a permit, should not be
approved."9  Although footnote 8 has not been judicially construed,
business and labor groups alike perceive it as an interpretation of the
intent of CEQA-that in public agency decisions on the merits of either
a public or private project, environmental protection should prevail
regardless of economic and social factors. 10
Such an interpretation, if in fact correct, raises serious questions
regarding the discretionary application of the police power. In its
discretion a public agency may consider some economic factors." Yet
the priority accorded to economic objectives appears to have been
usurped by the provisions of CEQA and footnote 8 of the Friends
of Mammoth decision, which now in effect require that environmental
factors be given much greater consideration than economic factors.
There appears to be no allowance for a balancing of the economic
and environmental objectives.' 2 This lack of effective consideration
of economic factors could lead to the eventual downfall of the remedial
environmental objectives of CEQA.
In an effort to avoid the anticipated consequences of footnote 8,
the legislature has begun attempts to vary the manner in which con-
5. CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, §1, at 2270.
6. For a general discussion of the aftermath of Friends of Mammoth see, Sen-
eker, The Legislative Response to Friends of Mammoth: Developers Chase the Will 0'
the Wisp, 48 CAL. S.B.J. 127 (1973).
7. See, for example, Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex.
1973).
8. 8 Cal. 3d at 260, 502 P.2d at 1057, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
9. Id. at 263, 502 P.2d at 1059, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
10. Senator Clark L. Bradley, Press Release, Senate Bill 1051, June 6, 1973;
California Chamber of Commerce, Legislative Issue Report, Vol. 73, No. 6, Apr. 30,
1973.
11. See text accompanying notes 15-34 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 35-52 infra.
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struction projects are considered for approval. The legislation intro-
duced in this area provides for systematic incorporation of economic
and social factors within the framework of CEQA.' 3 However, each
bill contains certain hazards which would, upon enactment of the bill,
create further problems.
While attempting to resolve this procedural problem regarding the
mechanics of a governmental decision, this comment delves deeply
into the broader problem of accomodating economic growth with en-
vironmental restraints. In this pursuit, the Alternative Land Use
Theory, 4 a theory providing a means whereby the total impact of
a proposed project is analyzed at various sites to determine the best
location, is offered for consideration. The application of this theory
seemingly results in the most desirable project, from both an eco-
nomic as well as an environmental viewpoint. This comment will
introduce the theory, discuss its relation to the pending legislation,
and suggest criteria for its incorporation in future legislative proposals.
However, before discussing a new method of incorporating ecornmic
and environmental objectives in the decision-making process, it is
necessary to determine if economic considerations are within the scope
of the police power and, if so, what limitations if any are placed upon
its use.
EcoNoMICS AS A VALID CONSIDERATION
A. Economics and the Public Welfare:
The Scope of the Police Power
The police power has been defined as the inherent reserve power
of a state to subject citizens' rights to reasonable regulation 5 and repre-
sents the generally accepted concept of public encroachment upon private
interests.' 6 In California this power has been delegated to cities and
counties within the state,17 and it is generally recognized that the power
13. A.B. 635, CAL. STArs. 1973, c. 895 (addition of §21155 to the Public Re-
sources Code); A.B. 938, 1973-74 Regular Session, as amended, Sept. 5, 1973; A.B.
1184, 1973-74 Regular Session; S.B. 1051, 1973-74 Regular Session, as amended,
Aug. 27, 1973 (proposed addition of §21091 to the Public Resources Code).
14. The "Alternative Land Use Theory" is a shorthand notation used by the
author to describe the procedure of economic evaluation of alternative land uses-a
procedure developed by Robert K. Arnold, Director of the Institute of Regional and
Urban Studies, 610 University Ave., Palo Alto, Calif. 94301.
15. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1920); Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381
(1925).
16. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
17. CAL. CoNsT. art. 11, §7, allows cities and counties to enact local regulatory
ordinances not in conflict with the general laws of the state. The legislature has also
specifically delegated police power to local governments, e.g., zoning law. CAL.
Gov'T CODE §65800 et seq.
1974 / Economic and Environmental Objectives
vested in every city and county is as broad as that vested in the
legislature itself. 8 Pursuant to this power, a city or county may re-
strict the use of land via a zoning ordinance, may amend existing
zones, and may grant or deny variances to these zones.' 9 Although
the use of the word "may" is indicative of the discretionary nature
of any agency's regulatory action, it belies the true nature of the deci-
sion. A decision is a conclusion chosen from a number of alterna-
fives, yet the choice is not haphazard for it must depend on the scope
of the information relied upon and the synthesis of that information.
The permitted scope of inquiry defines the type of information which
the agency is allowed to consider, and the synthesis of that information,
in its most theoretical form, is the procedural mechanism whereby
the relative influence of each piece of information is measured. Since
regulatory action is subject to the constitutional limitations imposed
upon the police power, it follows that laws may be enacted which
define or limit both the scope of the information used2° and the syn-
thesis of that information.21 Therefore, before discussing the wisdom
or legality of balancing economic and environmental factors-one way
of synthesizing this information-it is necessary to determine whether
economic factors may constitutionally be considered in the making of
governmental decisions and what, if any, limitations may be placed
upon the use of economic factors.
California and federal courts have a long history of liberally con-
struing the constitutional scope of the police power.22 The United
States Supreme Court recognized that any attempt to define or trace
the limits of the police power would be fruitless for each case must
turn on its own facts.23 The California courts have recognized that
the police power is broad, elastic, and changes with social and economic
progress.2 4  Indeed, it extends generally to measures designed to pro-
mote the public convenience and the general prosperity. 25 Since the
18. Stanislaus County Dairymen's Protective Ass'n v. Stanislaus County, 8 Cal. 2d
378, 384, 65 P.2d 1305, 1307 (1937).
19. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1920); Miller v.
Boaird of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 479, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925); CAL. Gov'T CODE
§65800 et seq.
20. A.B. 1301, 1971 Regular Session. as introduced (subsequently amended and
enacted, CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1446. at 2852), required local government disapproval of
subdivisions if it finds the subdivision to be economically unfeasible. This provision
was amended out of the bill prior to passage.
21. CAL. PuB. Rus. CODE §21001(d).
22. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1920); Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381
(1925).
23. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
24. Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 479, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925).
25. Bahannan v. City of San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 3d 416, 422, 106 Cal. Rptr.
333, 336 (1973).
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economic growth of a community and the concomitant economic needs
of its citizens are public welfare considerations, the regulation of land
use based on a community-wide economic analysis is within the scope
of the police power.26
Although it is clear that economic factors may be considered in
governmental decisions, such use is not without limitation. These limi-
tations include the constitutional proscriptions of due process, 27 the
"taking" provision of the fifth amendment, and the equal protection
clause.28 The due process proscription mandates that use of the police
power can only be justified if it appears required in the public inter-
est, and if the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose without being unduly oppressive.2 0  Thus those eco-
nomic factors for which there is no sufficient public need are consti-
tutionaly banned from the scope of the police power. For example,
a zoning ordinance establishing a minimum floor area in new houses
in a particular district was held to be unconstitutional upon a showing
that the purpose of the ordinance was to protect the investment of those
persons who had already built in that district.3 0 Furthermore, the
regulation must be reasonable, for if found to be unreasonable it be-
comes a "taking" under the fifth amendment8 1 and is an unconstitu-
tional exercise of the police power unless compensation is made. How-
ever, it should be noted that whenever a discretionary regulation is
involved,32 any rights lost in the denial of a project are merely expec-
tancy rights. Thus a finding of reasonableness will not be disturbed
by the courts in the absence of a clear and convincing showing of
an abuse of discretion. 3
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment may place
a different limitation on the inclusion of some economic factors within
the scope of the inquiry. The consideration of economic factors which
tend to discriminate against the poor without sufficient reason, such
as giving priority to residences with high assessed values and low serv-
ice demands, probably constitutes invidious discrimination prohibited
26. National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 379,
27 Cal. Rptr. 136, 138 (1962), held that the police power can be used to consider
"the economic question of what will repel or attract customers to a substantial business
in the county."
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
28. Id.
29. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
30. Sefiefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 731, 12 N.W.2d 387, 390 (1943). But
see, Stayanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
31. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
32. CAL. PuB. Rns. CODE §21080(a).
33. Siller v. Board of Supervisors, 58 Cal. 2d 479, 484, 375 P.2d 41, 44, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 73, 76 (1962).
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by the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.8 4
B. Limitations Imposed by CEQA: Synthesis of Information
Although governmental agencies may generally regulate for eco-
nomic reasons, this power may have been limited by CEQA. Before
CEQA was enacted, a public agency considered a variety of factors
in determining whether to permit a project; certainly low in priority,
as evidenced by the uncontrolled growth in this state, was the environ-
mental impact of the project. Although the claim is made that the
purpose of CEQA is merely to provide an environmental full-disclosure
document through the EIR,35 a more persuasive argument can be made
that the purpose of CEQA, as articulated in the policy declaration,3"
is to reorder the importance assigned to environmental factors and
to change an agency's priorities from encouragement of economic
growth to intelligent regulation of growth with environmental consid-
erations paramount. This contention seems to negate the possibility
of balancing economic and environmental factors, for balancing envi-
sions placing these factors on an equal footing in the synthesizing
process. The argument continues that the thrust of CEQA as origi-
nally formulated,3 7 the subsequent court interpretation thereof,38 and
the subsequent amendments thereto3 9 incorporate substantive legal
rights and obligations whicl forbid placing environmental and eco-
nomic factors on an equal footing.40 Although a strong case for this
contention can be made, a discussion of its merits is outside the scope
of this comment. Rather, if the validity of the argument is assumed,
an examination of the language of CEQA will demonstrate the reason
why balancing would be prohibited.
Several key phrases within the policy declarations of CEQA4'
indicate that the legislature intended to supplant traditional planning
34. See generally Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning
After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J 61 (1971).
35. For a similar discussion of NEPA, see Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps
of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972).
36. CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE §§21000, 21001.
37. A.B. 2045, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1433, §1, at 2780.
38. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049,
104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
39. A.B. 889, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1154, §1, at 2270.
40. The substantive rights argument states that an EIR is more than a procedural
document requiring full disclosure of environmental harm. Since environmental ob-
jectives are given paramount importance under CEQA, it is argued that the EIR
should change the decision-making process in that the information disclosed by the
EIR must affect the decision. For a discussion of the substantive rights argument
under NEPA, see Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289
(8th Cir. 1972).
41. The Legislature finds and declares as follows:
(a) The maintenance of a quality environment for the people of this
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policy and institute a program which favored environmental rather
than economic factors. California, in recognizing (1) the limited ca-
pacity of the environment,42 (2) the requirement for the state to
take immediate steps to identify critical thresholds,43 and (3) the ne-
cessity of taking all coordinated action to prevent the crossing of these
thresholds,4" has shown its awareness of the imminency of the perma-
nent diminution of our quality of life. Imminency of danger mandates
a firm approach. Thus placing economic and environmental factors
on an equal footing hardly seems to comply with the spirit of the
legislative intent.
state now and in the future is a matter of statewide concern.
(b) It is necessary to provide a high-quality environment that at all
times is healthful and pleasing to the senses and intellect of man.
(c) There is a need to understand the relationship between the mainte-
nance of high-quality ecological systems and the general welfare of the people
of the state, including their enjoyment of the natural resources of the state.
(d) The capacity of the environment is limited, and it is the intent of the
Legislature that the government of the state take immediate steps to identify
any critical thresholds for the health and safety of the people of the state and
take all coordinated actions necessary to prevent such thresholds being
reached.
(e) Every citizen has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation
and enhancement of the environment.
(f) The interrelationship of policies and practices in the management of
natural resources and waste disposal requires systematic and concerted ef-
forts by public and private interests to enhance environmental quality and to
control environmental pollution.
(g) It is the intent of the Legislature that all agencies of the state govern-
ment which regulate activities of private individuals, corporations, and public
agencies which are found to affect the quality of the environment, shall
regulate such activities so that major consideration is given to preventing en-
vironmental damage.
CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §21000.
The Legislature further finds and declares that it is the policy of the state to:
(a) Develop and maintain a high-quality environment now and in the fu-
ture, and take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the
environmental quality of the state.
(b) Take all action necessary to provide the people of this state with
clean air and water, enjoyment of aesthetic, natural, scenic, and historic en-
vironmental qualities, and freedom from excessive noise.
(c) Prevent the elimination of fish or wildlife species due to man's ac-
tivities, insure that fish and wildlife populations do not drop below self-per-
petuating levels, and preserve for future generations representations of all
plant and animal communities and examples of the major periods of Cal-
ifornia history.
(d) Ensure that the long-term protection of the environment shall be the
guiding criterion in public decisions.
(e) Create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist
in productive harmony to fulfill the social and economic requirements of
present and future generations.
(f) Require governmental agencies at all levels to develop standards and
procedures necessary to protect environmental quality.
(g) Require governmental agencies at all levels to consider qualitative
factors as well as economic and technical factors and long-term benefits and
costs, in addition to short-term benefits and costs, and to consider alterna-
tives to proposed actions affecting the environment.
CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21001.
42. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21000(d).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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Three other intent sections of CEQA further show the priority
which the legislature felt was due environmental considerations. All
government agencies must give major consideration to preventing
environmental damage,45 must "take all action necessary to rehabilitate
and enhance the environmental quality of the state, ' 40 and must "insure
that the long-term protection of the environment shall be the guiding
criterion in public decisions. ' 47  Furthermore, the sections in CEQA
which support the conclusion that balancing is forbidden, despite contrary
language in the guidelines45 promulgated pursuant to CEQA,4 9 were not
amended by Assembly Bill 889.
Further support is given to the argument that balancing of economic
and environmental interests is outside the intended scope of CEQA
by an examination of federal case law. Since CEQA was patterned
after NEPA, federal court interpration of NEPA is highly persuasive
precedent for California court interpretations of CEQA.50 With regard
to the question of balancing, a recent federal district court decision,
Sierra Club v. Froehlke,5 1 held, inter alia:
What must not be overlooked is the priority assigned by Congress
to environmental factors under NEPA. As this Court under-
stands this body of law, protection of the environment is now
viewed as paramount, and it is not to be placed on an equal footing
with the usual economic and technical factors. 52
From the foregoing analysis one can conclude that, although eco-
nomics is a valid subject of consideration by a public agency, because
of the proscriptions of CEQA these objectives cannot presently be
balanced with environmental factors during the synthesizing process.
How ECONOMICS MAY BE CONSIDERED
Although it appears that little if any priority may be accorded eco-
nomic considerations under CEQA,53 such a position ignores the com-
45. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21000(g).
46. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21001(a).
47. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21001(d) (emphasis added).
48. Guidelines for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act
of 1970, CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §15000 et seq. Section 15012 of the CEQA Guide-
lines states, inter alia, that "public agencies retain existing authority to balance en-
vironmental objectives with economic and social objectives." (emphasis added). The
substantive problems created by this section are currently the subject of a lawsuit,
Petitioner's Brief for Writ of Mandate, Center for Law in the Public Interest, Inc. v.
Livermore, LA No. 30168, Aug. 16, 1973, and although issues are clearly raised which
are contrary to the intent of CEQA, a substantive discussion is not within the scope
of this comment.
49. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §21083.
50. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 260, 502 P.2d
1049, 1057, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 769 (1972).
51. 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
52. Id. at 1370.
53. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21001.
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pelling practical aspects involved in virtually every construction project.
Most business decisions, whether public or private, are made under a
cost-benefit analysis wherein all factors are placed on an equal footing.
The cost-benefit ratio is determinative. Once this cost-benefit pro-
cedure is fully understood, the necessity of considering the economics
of the situation on, an equpi footing with the environmental factor
becomes apparent.
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis
In Sierra Club v. Froehlke the court succinctly outlined the cost-
benefit theory.
A study of the record in this case, and particularly the Congres-
sional hearings since fiscal year 1966 as they apply to projects con-
tained within the ambit of the Trinity [Dam] Project, points up
the importance of benefit-cost ratios in the appropriation and de-
cision-making process for public works projects funded by the
United States Government. The benefit-cost ratio is basically a
comparison of the anticipated "benefits" derived from a particular
public works project with the anticipated "costs" over the estimated
life span of the projects. Both benefits and costs must be stated
in monetary terms. Furthermore, since benefits and costs will be
accruing over the many years of the project's life span, it is nec-
essary to discount them so that their present values may be deter-
mined and compared. . . . Once this has been done, if a com-
parison indicates that the projected benefits will reasonably exceed
the costs, then, all other things being equal, the project is typically
regarded as being "justified." If, for example, it was expected
that for every one dollar of federal investment in a given project
the benefits would be equal to two dollars, then the benefit-to-cost
ration would be 2.0 to 1 or 2.0:1. If the benefits equal the costs,
the ratio is 1:1 or unity, as the term is used.5 4
The cost-benefit analysis described in Sierra Club v. FroehIke repre-
sents only one aspect of consideration before a project, such as a dam,
is finally commenced, for it represents an analysis of the need for such a
project. Often with public projects, once the need is determined, the
best location for the project must also be determined-best location
generally reflecting a cost-benefit approach. Although engineering con-
siderations generally play a key role in determining the location of a pro-
ject, these considerations are still made on a cost-benefit basis.55
54. 359 F. Supp. at 1362.
55. See generally, W Is AD, ECOLOGIC-ECONoMc ANALYsis FOR REGIONAL DE-
vEoPlMEN (1st ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as IsARD]; C. WEsT CHURCHMAN, Tim
SysTEMs APPROACH (1st ed. 1968); PLAmINa PROGRAMMING BUDGETINo: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH TO MANAGEMENT (1st ed. F.J. Lyden and E.G. Miller 1968).
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With respect to private projects, this concept of considering alterna-
tive uses for land has been confusingly alluded to by Friends of Mam-
moth and CEQA. Footnote 8 of Friends of Mammoth56 enters as
a source of confusion when it suggests that "feasible alternatives" to
the proposed activity should be considered. This confusion is further
amplified in CEQA. In the section containing the declaration of
policy, CEQA requires that government agencies at all levels "consider
alternatives to the proposed actions affecting the environment."57 One
of the purposes of an EIR is to "suggest alternatives to such a [pro-
posed] project."58  Additionally, the implementation section requires
that an EIR shall include a detailed statement of "alternatives to the
proposed action."59  It remains unclear whether the court and the
legislature were suggesting that a project with less environmental im-
pact located on the proposed site should be considered as an alternative
or whether relocation of the proposed project, as suggested by the
Alternative Land Use Theory, should be considered as a valid alterna-
tive.
B. Problems with Economic Considerations Under
CEQA and Pending Legislation
It is undeniable that economics is a vital force in the growth of
a region and should likewise be a major consideration in the discre-
tionary decision-making process of a public agency. Decisions affect-
ing the public, be they decisions on the merits of a public or private
project, should have the public welfare as the goal,60 assessing both
the short-term and long-term impact of the project on the quality of
life. The assessment should not be limited to either economic or en-
vironmental factors nor should one factor be accorded more priority
than th6 other, for a fair decision can be made only by according
equal treatment to all factors. 61
In Sierra Club v. Froehlke the cost-benefit analysis prepared by
the Corps of Engineers contained an economic analysis of the envi-
ronmental benefits without an accompanying discussion of the quanti-
fiable environmental costs. This gave rise to the court's observation
that environmental impact should be set forth in quantitative terms.
Examining the legislative history of NEPA, the court noted,
56. 8 Cal. 3d at 263, 502 P.2d at 1059, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
57. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21001(g) (emphasis added).
58. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21061 (emphasis added).
59. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §21100(d) (emphasis added).
60. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
61. See text accompanying note 62 infra.
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Congress evidently contemplated that benefit-cost procedures might
be adaptable to include environmental considerations. In dis-
cussing the duties and functions of the CEQ [Council on Environ-
mental Quality], NEPA's legislative history recited how environ-
mental amenities might be given suitable consideration: "One
way in which this might be done would be to develop a sophis-
ticated cost and benefit analysis-in which the total (and not
strictly economic) consequences of federal activities may be as-
sessed."62
CEQA has not yet proposed such an analysis procedure.6 3
The court further voiced its concern about a seemingly favorable
cost-benefit ratio when it noted that "a valid favorable benefit-cost ratio
combining all facets of a project must represent the final synthesis
of technical, economic, and environmental factors. ' 4  It is therefore
apparent that the possible inequities arising from a comparison of
qualitative and quantitative factors has been noted by Congress and
this appellate court.
The provisions of CEQA do not provide that equal weight be
given to environmental and economic considerations05 because envi-
ronmental objectives are to be the guiding criteria in public decisions, 0
while economic factors are merely to be considered.T Although pro-
posals exist which attempt to balance environmental and economic
objectives, 6 the balancing suggested only extends to a determination
of the necessity for such a project and ignores an analysis of the best
location.6  The Alternative Land Use Theory combines these two
cost-benefit analyses (need and location) into one comprehensive
formulation yielding the least expensive project from both an eco-
nomic and environmental viewpoint.
C. The Alternative Land Use Theory
An understanding of two underlying postulates is necessary before
62. 359 F. Supp. at 1364, citing from H. REP. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMiN. NEws 2760 (1969).
63. 359 F. Supp. at 1364.
64. Id. at 1370.
65. See text accompanying notes 35-52 supra.
66. -CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §21001(d).
67. CAL. Pun. REs. CODE §21001(g).
68. A.B. 635, CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 895; A.B. 938, 1973-74 Regular Session,
as amended, Sept. 5, 1973.
69. Although A.B. 635, CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 895, §1, provides that "alternative
land use policies" are to be evaluated and that the "economic efficiency" of land use
decisions is to be evaluated, it is unclear whether the "alternatives" relate to the best
project for the proposed location or the best location for the proposed project. More-
over, A.B. 938, 1973-74 Regular Session, as amended, Sept. 5, 1973, §3, at 4, appears
to restrict its economic analysis to the project proposed and does not consider alterna-
tives.
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the general theory can be discussed. First, a true cost-benefit analysis
should reflect all significant direct costs and benefits. This can best
be accomplished by expanding a community economic analysis into
a regional analysis.70 Secondly, a cost-benefit analysis is a twofold
process, the first step being the ascertainment of the need for such
a project and the second being a determination of its most suitable
location.
With respect to a regional analysis, the necessity of a project can
be determined by assessing all known or anticipated costs and com-
puting all derivable benefits from the project and comparing the val-
ues.71 Local community cost-benefit analysis is usually limited to an
analysis of the fiscal impact of a project, that is the cost of supplying
city services and the benefits derivable therefrom.72  However, the re-
gion and not the local community is the more appropriate economic
unit for one cannot make a meaningful cost-benefit analysis of most
urban developments on a community level without considering extra-
community factors. 73  Assume, for example, that the city of Emery-
ville approves the construction of a high-rise office building on private
land abutting the San Francisco Bay. Assume also that this decision
was made on the basis of an economic analysis which revealed that
the benefits to be derived, such as increased property tax and local
employment, outweighed the costs involved, such as the expense of
supplying city services and increased traffic burden. However, a re-
gional analysis would reveal that the costs were not correctly assessed
in that part of the quality of life of everyone living within the Bay
Area is the aesthetic value of the view of the Bay and a debasement
of the quality of the view or an obstruction thereof is harmful. Al-
though this cost may be difficult to quantify, it is well established
that the better one's view of the Bay, the higher one's rent. There-
fore, economists could certainly attribute part of the total rent paid
within the entire Bay region to the aesthetic value of the view. Loss
or deterioration of the view could be reflected by lost rent revenues
which should be included within the regional cost of the project.
The second postulate involves the twofold nature of the cost-benefit
analysis. For a public project, the necessity of the project constitutes
the first phase of the analysis. This phase receives the most public
attention since approval results in the expenditure of public funds.
70. H.W. RICHARDSON, REGIONAL EcONOMIcs 229 (1st ed. 1969).
71. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1363 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
72. Address by Robert K. Arnold (Director of the Institute of Regional and Ur-
ban Studies), Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) Statewide Conference,
Nov. 18, 1971.
73. See generally IsAM, supra note 55.
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The second phase consists of finding a suitable location for such
a project and generally involves engineering considerations which
are quantified and analyzed in terms of least cost.74  With respect
to private projects, CEQA and the economic criteria in the pending
legislation limit their analysis to the need for the project without
inquiring into its most suitable location.7  However, since the pur-
pose of a cost-benefit analysis is to justify the expenditure of public
funds and any infringement on the quality of life, the project receiving
the most justification, i.e. that project with the greatest cost-benefit
ratio, should be the one which receives approval. This can only be
accomplished by also analyzing the location of the proposed project.
This approach of economic evaluation of alternative land use is the
subject of some rather foresighted and controversial analyses relating
to the concept of public economics.76
The larger scope of public economic inquiry as compared with the
rather limited considerations of a private analysis should be mentioned.
In a private analysis the decision maker compares his costs against
his benefits. Public economics on the other hand focuses on the iden-
tification and measurement of the costs and benefits of alternative uses
throughout the total community. Public economics includes the more
traditional market place economics used by the private sector; how-
ever, where market economics concentrates on private cost-benefit,
public economics examines regional costs and benefits and therefore
concerns itself with the economic evaluation of alternative land uses.
For example, when United States Steel proposed construction of an
office building on the San Francisco waterfront, strong objections
based on planning and aesthetics arose with respect to the location
of the building. Utilizing the Alternative Land Use Theory,77 several
feasible locations were chosen within the Bay region (the proposed
site included), and all locations were analyzed with respect to fiscal
impact, distribution of impacts, economic value of other impacts, and
social/cultural goals. These criteria comprise the substance of the
theory and are discussed in detail below.7"
74. Id.
75. See note 69 supra.
76. See generally S. Lvy, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE LAND
UsES (1972) (Institute of Regional and Urban Studies, 610 University Ave., Palo Alto,
Calif. 94301).
77. Interview with Robert K. Arnold, Director of the Institute of Regional and
Urban Studies, Palo Alto, Calif., July 24, 1973.
78. For specific applications of this approach see, R. ARNOLD & S. LEvY, SuM-
MARY OF WORK ON EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE L ND USES IN SONOMA COUNTY
1971-1972 (1972); R. ARNOLD & S. LEvy, AN APPLICATION OF A PLANNING AND
EvALUATION PROCESS TO FOUR RESIDENTIAL GRowTH PATrERNS IN MILPITAS 1972-1977
(1972); R. ARNOLD & S. LEVY, AN APPLICATION OF A PLANNING AND EVALUATION
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The initial area of inquiry is probably the one which is most familiar
to public agencies for it deals with an analysis of their costs and bene-
fits. Stated differently, this measures the impact of a project upon
city revenues versus city expenditures. Analysis of city costs should
include consideration of increased burden on the fire and police depart-
ments, the building and maintenance of new roads to handle the in-
creased traffic, parking problems, traffic flow problems created on
existing roads, increased burden on, schools incurred by population
influx, the cost of building new water, gas, and sewer lines, and the
increased burden on the sewer system and the pro rata costs associ-
ated with any expansions thereof. These costs represent only one side
of a fiscal analysis, the other side being the cash inflow to the city
treasury because of increased property tax revenues from property
made more valuable by the project. If a decision were rendered simply
on a cost-benefit fiscal analysis, many projects would not receive ap-
proval, especially low-income housing projects for which tax revenues
do not equal the cost of providing services.79 However, another area
of consideration is warranted, and a public agency should look beyond
its cost and benefits and examine other aspects of community well-
being. Other factors may dictate that a fiscally attractive project be
disapproved or that one fiscally unattractive be approved.
The second consideration in our public economic analysis is a study
of the distribution-of-impact factor. The Alternative Land Use
Theory suggests changing the site of a proposed project if there will
be less environmental harm at another site within the region. Al-
though removing the project from one community can mean serious
economic losses to that community in the form of lost jobs, lost spend-
able income to local businesses, and lost tax revenues to the city, this
loss is minimized in public economics theory since relocation of the
project within the region merely transfers the economic gain of one
community to another and, within our regional scope of analysis,
the relocation of a project within the region does not have a detrimen-
tal impact on regional economics. s°
The third aspect is the evaluation of other impacts. Presently this
PROCESS IN THE DiABLo PLAiNo ARa (1971) [hereinafter cited as THE SUNNYVALE
STUiDY]. The above sources were prepared by the Institute of Regional and Urban
Studies, 610 University Ave., Palo Alto, Calif. 94301.
79. See generally Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning
After Valtierra and Dandridge. 81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971).
80. However, because the region is divided into independent units of govern-
ment, some of which will suffer and others of which will gain by relocation, a tax
equalization scheme to equitably distribute the benefits of new development would ap-
pear necessary. See The Metropolitan Distribution Act, MINN. STATS ANN. §473F.01
et seq. (1973).
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analysis takes the form of an EIR which presents the impact of a
project in physical terms, i.e. a qualitative analysis. Although recog-
nition of environmental impact is a significant advance in the process
of land use optimization, a qualitative approach does not fit nicely
into the scheme of total economic evaluation. The agency considers
the EIR, a qualitative report, and the economics of the project before
making its own subjective, non-systematic economic evaluation of the
physical impact. This questionable process of synthesizing qualitative
and quantitative information is not rational and can be corrected by
taking into account the fact that environmental harm, no matter how
difficult to quantify, is nothing more than economic impact in dis-
guise. Cost is the real issue. How much will it cost to protect the
environment is the question. Although it may appear difficult to
quantify environmental impact, it seems logical to attempt to develop
schemes whereby these impacts can be translated into their dollar
equivalents and integrated into our total economic evaluation.
Identification and measurement of these impacts in physical terms
is a new field, and much is left to be learned. Scientists do not yet
understand all of the indirect subtleties accompanying an attempt
to change a given aspect of our environment. Translation of these
physical measurements into dollar costs is also a new area which is
being researched by economists on a fairly broad front.8 ' Two theo-
ries are now in use which attempt to measure environmental harm
in monetary terms. One approach is to directly quantify the costs
associated with environmental harm. For example, air pollution can
reduce the amount of sunlight which penetrates to a crop and cause
a reduction in crop quality and productivity. Air pollution can also
disrupt the food chain. If, for example, the by-product of an eco-
nomic activity reduces the rate of photosynthesis in a particular area
then the effects of those by-products upon organisms which consume
the green plants can be estimated using food chain data.s , Local
water pollution can affect downstream drinking water with the concom-
itant need to build expensive water treatment plants.83 Also water
pollution can affect the recreational uses of a body of water which
can be quantified.
84
An alternative way of measuring physical impact in monetary terms
81. See generally S. LEVY, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE LAND
UsEs (1972).
82. IsARD, supra note 55, at 55.
83. Id.
84. Id. For a complex example of this process, see Address by John Zierold,
Legislative Advocate of the Sierra Club, Hearing before the Water Resources Council,
Mar. 14, 1972.
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is presently being formulated at the Institute of Regional and Urban
Studies. This method measures the environmental impact of a project
as it is reflected in the projected changes in the value of existing prop-
erty. An example of this technique can be found in a Sunnyvale
studysa which evaluated industrial versus residential development in
a 500-acre tract located between two existing blocks of housing, Or-
chard Gardens and Lakewood Village. First, information was ob-
tained from members of the city and county staff which revealed that
if a new housing development were located in the 500-acre tract, the
existing residents in Orchard Gardens would realize significant ad-
vantages in terms of improved community services, shopping facilities,
and access to schools. Secondly, it was discovered that the existing
housing in Orchard Gardens had failed to experience the same rate
of appreciation as housing with the same physical qualities located
in other areas of the City of Sunnyvale. In these other areas it was
revealed that the community facilities, shopping facilities, and access
to schools were much better than those existing in Orchard Gardens.
It was therefore concluded that the improved physical facilities and
access to the residents of Orchard Gardens should be reflected to
some extent in an increase in the value of existing homes in Orchard
Gardens. With an assumption of only a modest increase in the
value of property in Orchard Gardens, the gains to the residents of
that area from residential development far outweighed any of the net
fiscal benefits of industrial development. In other words, with an analy-
sis limited to fiscal impact only, industrial development was calculated
to provide a net surplus of property tax revenues to the city and school
district, whereas the residential development would produce a net defi-
cit. But when the gains to the residents of Orchard Gardens were
calculated into the equation, the residential development had a more
favorable cost-benefit ratio than the industrial development.
The last element of the theory is the evaluation of the social/cultural
objectives. This element illustrates the concept that the total evalua-
tion of alternative land uses cannot, and should not, be made com-
pletely in economic terms.s6 For example, the goals of a community
to achieve cultural or housing diversity can hardly be evaluated directly
in dollar terms. At the same time, however, by placing the consider-
ation of social or cultural goals explicitly within the evaluation frame-
work, the community can determine whether the achievement of a
specific cultural objective will be enhanced or thwarted by a specific
85. See THE SUNNYVALE STUDY, supra note 78.
86. Interview with Robert K. Arnold, supra note 61; see also A. TOFFLER,
FUrTuE SHOCK 452-58 (Ist ed. Bantam 1970).
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alternative. In Sunnyvale, the Institute found that a housing develop-
ment properly designed and developed would assist the City of Sunny-
vale in achieving its objectives of cultural and housing diversity in
the particular neighborhood under investigation. In contrast, the in-
dustrial development would have had either a neutral or negative
effect. Therefore, there was an additional benefit derived from resi-
dential development. However, if the industrial development had been
more advantageous in dollar terms than the residential development
when both fiscal and economic value of other impacts were calculated,
the city would have to determine if it wanted to pay for the objectives
of achieving cultural and housing diversity by foregoing fiscal benefits
of industrial development.
Another reason exists for keeping the social/cultural objectives in
qualitative terms. The very nature of the exercise of the police power
is judgmental-most decisions are discretionary. With respect to a
proposed project, if all factors are quantified, the discretionary element
is lost for a decision is mandated by the cost-benefit ratio. Therefore,
to insure the existence of local discretion, it is necessary to require
that social/cultural factors be analyzed in a subjective fashion.
It seems apparent that there is a method for a realistic assessment
of the impact of alternative land uses on a total community, and that
such an assessment can be made in economic as well as qualitative
terms. It is the responsibility of the decision maker to require that
all relevant information be provided to allow him to understand how
alternatives affect the total community. The public official has the
responsibility of assessing alternatives from the perspective of the total
community, not from the perspective of the private decision maker.
87
CURRENT LITIGATION AND PENDING LEGISLATION
An examination of current litigation and pending legislation in Cali-
fornia reveals the confusion which now exists surrounding the enforce-
ment of CEQA, but more importantly it reveals that the state's goal
of environmental preservation is being deterred and points to the need
for a new, more comprehensive economic evaluation policy.
Current litigation in California is primarily concerned with two areas
of controversy-the confusion which resulted after footnote 8 of
Friends of Mammoth, and possible shortcomings of the Office of Plan-
ning and Research (OPR) Guidelines88 which were intended to imple-
87. See THE SUNNYVALE STUDY, supra note 78; see also Address by Robert K.
Arnold, suprq note 72.
88. CA. ADrM, . CODE tit. 14, §15000 et seq.
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CEQA. In footnote 8 the court stated that "obviously if the adverse
consequences to the environment can be mitigated, or if feasible alter-
natives are available, the proposed activity, such as issuance of a
permit, should not be approved."' 9 A pending suit90 is seeking to
establish footnote 8 as case law in California. This would require
that no activity be permitted if there is a more environmentally desir-
able alternative, regardless of economic or other considerations. Case
law such as this, however, would establish that environmental consid-
erations are the only criteria and not "the guiding criteria in public
decision."'" This result would be unrealistic since intelligently con-
trolled economic growth is essential to the state's well-being. Addi-
tionally, such a possibility appears to be outside the intended scope
of CEQA in that the legislature recognized that economic considera-
tions were important and included their admission in both the declara-
tion of policy92 and the implementation section.
9 3
The second area of current litigation 4 concerns the sufficiency of
the OPR Guidelines promulgated pursuant to CEQA. The petitioner
in this case seeks to have the California Supreme Court declare, inter
alia, that Section 15012 of the Guidelines is invalid in that it is contrary
to the express language of California Public Resources Code Section
21001(d). Section 15012 of the Guidelines provides that "public
agencies retain existing authority to balance environmental objec-
tives with economic and social objectives." It is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to see how the environmental factors are to be "the guiding criteria
in public decisions"' when public agencies retain existing authority to
treat environmental factors as they always have.96 If the court invali-
dates Section 15012, local agencies will still be without the guidance
necessary to consider economic factors if environmental factors are to be
the "guiding criteria." These two cases thus represent the conflict
which exists between those seeking environmental quality and those
seeking economic growth. However, if the legislature were to recognize
that economics encompasses environmental quality, there would be no
need for a law which tends to assign different priorities to these factors.
Pursuant to the scare97 evoked by footnote 8 of Friends of Mam-
89. 8 Cal. 3d at 263, 502 P.2d at 1059, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
90. Burger v County of Mendocino, 1 Civil No. 32455, filed Dec. 21, 1972, 1st
Dist. Ct. of App.
91. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §21001(d).
92. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21001(g).
93. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21100.
94. Center for Law in the Public Interest, Inc. v. Livermore, LA 30168, Aug. 16,
1973.
95. CAL. PUB. Rns. CoDE §21001(d).
96. CAL. ADmrN. CODE tit. 14, §15012.
97. Hearings on the California Environmental Quality Act, supra note 4.
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moth, four pieces of legislation were sponsored by various building
and labor interests seeking to provide for a more balanced considera-
tion of the environmental and economic factors. 8 The only bill en-
acted thus far is Assembly Bill 635,11 introduced by Assemblyman
Arnett, which provides for an economic practices manual for local
agencies to use in collating the economic, environmental, and social
consequences of a proposed project.' Assembly Bill 938, introduced
by Assemblyman Warren, mandates, in the case of large projects, the
inclusion of an economic impact statement in the environmental im-
pact report, sets forth the elements which such statement must con-
tain, and requires that economic and environmental considerations be
balanced.100 Assembly Bill 1184, introduced by Assemblyman Russell,
would amend the Government Code to include economic considerations
within the general plan on community developmental policies.10' Fin-
ally, Senate Bill 1051, introduced by Senator Bradley, would change
the intent section of CEQA to require that environmental considera-
tions be "a principal guiding criteria" rather than "the guiding criter-
ion" in public decisions. 102  Although it is apparent that some changes
are needed, these bills have substantial shortcomings and would further
add to the confusion in this area.
The commands of CEQA seem clear. In the process of information
synthesis, environmental factors are to be the guiding criteria' 03 while
economic and other technical factors are to be merely considered.' 04
Sierra Club v. Froehike, interpreting NEPA, further declared that these
factors could not be placed on an equal footing. 05 Only Senate Bill
1051 seeks to amend the intent section of CEQA by providing that
environmental considerations shall be "a principal guiding criteria."' 0
This change, however, would produce greater confusion since it con-
flicts with the express language of California Public Resources Code
Sections 21000(d), 21000(g), 21001(a), and 21001(b) which pro-
vide, in effect, that environmental considerations should be paramount.
The other three bills seek to establish economic interests as an equal
98. A.B. 635, CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 895 (addition of §21155 to the Public Re-
sources Code); A.B. 938, 1973-74 Regular Session, as amended, Sept. 5, 1973; A.B.
1184, 1973-74 Regular Session; S.B. 1051, 1973-74 Regular Session, as amended,
Aug. 27, 1973 (proposed addition of §21091 to the Public Resources Code).
99. CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 895.
100. A.B. 938, 1973-74 Regular Session, as amended, Sept. 5, 1973.
101. A.B. 1184, 1973-74 Regular Session.
102. S.B. 1051, 1973-74 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 27, 1973.
103. CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE §21001(d).
104. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §21001(g).
105. 359 F. Supp. at 1370.
106. Pursuant to S.B. 1051, 1973-74 Regular Session, as amended, Aug. 27, 1973,
§1, it is the policy of the State of California to "ensure that the long-term protection of
the environment shall be a principal guiding criterion in public decision."
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consideration without attempting to change the intent sections of
CEQA, the law which governs the entire area.
Another source of confusion in the pending legislation is the quanti-
fication of the social/cultural factor. Assembly Bill 635 tends to treat
this factor as quantifiable since it seeks to "equate" the social and
economic factor with the environmental factor. 10 7  However, as dis-
cussed above, the social/cultural factor cannot, and should not, be
cast into an economic formulation. This factor defies quantification
for it is based upon the desirability of such a project; "desire" re-
flects the social or cultural utility, hence the difficulty in quantification.
Secondly, the feasibility of such a quantification is not as significant
as the advisability, for to cast this factor in monetary terms would
eliminate the only remaining discretionary element in public decisions.
Once the cost-benefit ratio is established, the decision would then be
mandated and local agencies would lose their primary function of mak-
ing discretionary judgments with regard to the merits on a proposed
project.
Another source of potential confusion in the legislation concerns
the proposed manner in which the environmental element is introduced
into the economic analysis. For a cost-benefit analysis to be mean-
ingful, the scope of inquiry concerning the costs of a project should
be as broad as the scope of inquiry of the benefits derivable there-
from. In Sierra Club v. FroehIke the environmental benefits were
included in the cost-benefit analysis, while many of the environmental
costs were omitted. With regard to the fairness of this analysis, the
court stated that "the meaning of the benefit-cost ratio, which is repre-
sented to the Congress, this Court, and the public as being an objective
evaluation of all quantifiable factors involved in these various projects,
is open to considerable question.' 08  Section 3 of Assembly Bill 938,
which details the scope of inquiry of the proposed economic impact
statement,10 9 fails to meet this standard of objectivity. To be fair
107. A.B. 635, CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 895, §2.
108. 359 F. Supp. at 1363.
109. [T]he environmental impact report shall also include a statement of the
economic impact of the project, covering such of the following, in qualitative
or quantitative terms, as is reasonably available and is determined by the
public agency, board, or commission to have a significant bearing on a pro-
ject:
(1) The approximate number and types of jobs to be created by the
project, including the number and types of permanent jobs to be created and
the impact of the project on unemployment.
(2) The impact of the project on the local tax base and the generation
of state and local sales tax and other tax revenues.
(3) The economic impact of the project on minority groups, if any, and
whether the project may improve the living conditions of residents of the
geographic area directly affected.
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and objective, a cost-benefit analysis should compare those benefits
of the geographic area affected with those costs which the same geo-
graphic area will incur. In Assembly Bill 938, the proposed amend-
ment to California Public Resources Code Section 21100(b)(6) is
apparently limited to the local cost of governmental services. How-
ever, Section 21100(b)(6) allows the community to include the pro-
jected generation of state sales tax. Section 21100(b)(5) allows the
community to assess benefits attributable to other communities, re-
gions, or the state, thereby allowing a more favorable treatment of
benefits in the supposedly objective cost-benefit analysis.
Not only should the geographic scope of inquiry be the same when
assessing both costs and benefits, the scope should be expanded from
a local to a regional analysis to reflect the fact that the region
is the natural economic unit. That is, the effects of most local deci-
sions having economic or environmental impacts extend to the geo-
graphic region.110  It therefore seems apparent that a local cost-
benefit analysis of a project cannot fairly measure the true costs and
benefits to the community unless it examines the regional economic
implications as well. As Robert K. Arnold points out,"1' the consid-
eration of regional implications of a project will give rise to stronger
regional governments which should have the power to control regional
development.1 "' Neither Assembly Bill 635 nor Assembly Bill 938
are clear as to the geographic scope of the economic inquiry.
Another problem area is the lack of mandatory inclusion of an eco-
nomic analysis whenever an EIR is required. To keep within the
proscriptions of CEQA" 3 and the proscriptions of the police power,
an economic analysis should always be conducted and the information
disclosed to the public to apprise them of the total costs and benefits
which they can expect. Otherwise, a local board's discretion would
be too broad in that environmentally sound but economically unsound
projects could receive approval. Assembly Bill 635 requires the Secre-
tary of the Resources Agency to advise local governments of the proper
(4) The economic impact of the alternatives to the proposed project, in-
cluding nonadoption.
(5) The impact of the project on purchasing power, per capita income,
income multipliers, and other economic indicators of the state, region, or
local area.
(6) The short-term and long-term costs of governmental services which
will be required as a result of the project, including, but not limited to,
costs affecting the public health, safety, and welfare.
A.B. 938, 1973-74 Regular Session, as amended, Sept. 5, 1973, §3, at 4.
110. See generally ISARD, supra note 55; ThE SUNNYvALE STuDY, supra note 78.
111. Interview with Robert K. Arnold, supra note 77.
112. See generally Marks & Taber, Prospects for Regional Planning in California,
4 PAC. L.J. 117 (1973).
113. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21001(g).
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manner in which to consider economic factors, but it does not mandate
that the factors be considered in that manner.
If economic evaluation of alternative land uses is to be made prior to
the approval of a project, and since a city or county cannot approve
a proposed subdivision or zoning change unless it conforms with the
general or specific plans,'-" it follows that a preliminary economic
evaluation of alternative urban development policies would be war-
ranted and that the general plan of a city or county should be modi-
fied accordingly. Assembly Bill 1184 seeks to incorporate an economic
element in the general plan which would reflect the "economic impact
and effect" of the implementation of the general plan as approved, 5
However, the provision should be expanded to provide for economic
analysis of alternative development policies as well as those contained
in the existing plan. An analysis of alternative policies should be
undertaken prior to the adoption of a plan or plan element or any
amendment thereof.
CONCLUSION
The equalization of the environmental and economic factors under
the Alternative Land Use Theory necessitates amendment of the con-
flicting provisions in CEQA. Also, in order to evaluate the need and
and desirability of a proposed project pursuant to the theory, the leg-
islation must reflect the necessity of a regional cost-benefit analysis.
Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the legislature to mandate that the
governmental agency prepare an economic analysis of a number of
feasible alternative sites within the region if the proposed project will
result in substantial environmental harm. Moreover, the legislature
should require that each site be objectively analyzed with respect to
fiscal impact, distributive impact, and environmental impact and then
subjectively analyzed with respect to the social/cultural desirability.
This evaluation of alternatives should satisfy the objectives of both
the business and labor interests and the environmentalists in that eco-
nomically beneficial projects will almost certainly be constructed in
the most appropriate location, thus avoiding any substantial environ-
mental harm.
It appears that the major failure of the pending legislation is that
environmental objectives are viewed as being adverse to economic ob-
114. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §11526(c); CAL. GOVT ACODE §65860. Each city
and county is required to adopt a general plan, CAL. Gov'T CODE §65300, and may
adopt specific plans, CAL. Gov'T CODE §65450.
115. A.B. 1184, 1973-74 Regular Session, §1, at 4.
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jectives, and, as such, are separately evaluated and then balanced to
somehow reach the "best" result. However, if the legislature accepts
the premise that all changes in the environment have both positive
and negative economic ramifications, it must also accept the conclusion
that economic evaluation of environmental impact comes within the
total economic objective of deriving the most benefits for the least cost.
John Michael Higginbotham
114
